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WAITING FOR GOOD DOUGH: LITIGATION FUNDING 
COMES TO LAW 
 
Stephen Gillers∗
 
 
Over the years, I have kept a mental list of the worst court decisions 
in the area of lawyer regulation.  Admission to this list is limited to ten.  
Being wrong is not enough; the opinion must be very wrong.  Even that 
is not enough.  Is the opinion thoughtful nonetheless?  Does it purport to 
be a serious treatment of the issue?  Is the court influential?  How much 
harm will the opinion likely cause?  Has it since been limited?  Each 
question must be asked and no single answer is determinative.  
Membership on the list shifts as new opinions appear and displace old 
ones or as cases are overruled.  Someday, I may write an article called 
The Ten Worst Opinions in Professional Responsibility.  Or maybe that 
should be the topic of a future panel discussion with each panelist taking 
an opinion or two. 
My current list includes: Balla v. Gambro, Inc.,1 Birbrower, 
Montalbano, Condon & Frank v. Superior Court,2 In re Cooperman,3
 
∗ Emily Kempin Professor of Law, New York University School of Law. © 2009 Stephen Gillers. 
 
 1.  584 N.E.2d 104 (Ill. 1991) (lawyer fired after he complied with state ethics requirement 
by revealing that employer had put a dangerous product on the market; held, employed lawyers do 
not have the same state retaliatory discharge claims available to other employees).  
 2.  949 P.2d 1, 13 (Cal. 1998) (denying fees to New York lawyers for work physically or 
“virtually” in California).  See also Stephen Gillers, Lessons from the Multijurisdictional Practice 
Commission: The Art of Making Change, 44 ARIZ. L. REV. 685 (2002) (attempting a microscopic 
analysis of the opinion in article on the work of the ABA commission that responded to the issues 
the case raised).    
 3.  633 N.E.2d 1069, 1071 (N.Y. 1994) (forbidding “special nonrefundable retainer fee 
agreements”).  I agree with the result in Cooperman and much of the analysis but believe the court 
wrote much too broadly and failed to define its terms. 
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Evans v. Jeff D.,4 Leis v. Flynt,5 Mickens v. Taylor,6 Professional 
Adjusters, Inc. v. Tandon,7 and Rancman v. Interim Settlement Funding 
Corp.8 Ranta v. McCarney9 had been on the list but Birbrower displaced 
it.  Birbrower is from a more influential court and addresses a lawyer’s 
virtual as well as physical presence in a state in its analysis of 
unauthorized practice of law by out of state lawyers.10  Its implications, 
if unrestrained, were breathtaking.11
In this Article, I want to examine Rancman.  The court’s treatment 
of one issue it raised—the question of champerty
  
12—is myopic, hostile, 
and superficial.  The resolution of this issue on the facts before the court 
promotes injustice.  The court introduced the issue into the case without 
the benefit of briefing.13  The Ohio legislature has since overruled 
Rancman.14  There is reason to believe that the Ohio Supreme Court will 
defer to the legislation, although we cannot know for certain until it 
addresses the question, as discussed below.15  But whatever the validity 
of the statute,16
 
 4.  475 U.S. 717, 728-30 (1986) (noting that a settlement offer in a class action may be 
conditioned on waiver of statutory counsel fee; plaintiff’s lawyer is ethically obligated to accept 
waiver).  
 the court’s broad view of champerty, a concept that 
 5.  439 U.S. 438 (1979) (per curiam opinion issued without oral argument and holding that 
Ohio could deny pro hac vice admission to New York lawyer, who had been retained to represent 
an accused in Ohio state court, without giving any reason and without a hearing).  
 6.  535 U.S. 162, 174-76 (2002) (explaining that a trial judge has no obligation to investigate 
assigned defense lawyer’s possible conflict of interest, even when she knows or should know of the 
conflict, unless lawyer personally raises the issue) (limiting Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475 
(1978)). 
 7.  433 N.E.2d 779, 783 (Ind. 1982) (declaring unconstitutional on separation of powers 
grounds a detailed legislative scheme that regulated and licensed insurance adjustors to negotiate on 
behalf of consumers with their insurers following a property loss). 
 8.  789 N.E.2d 217 (Ohio 2003).  
 9.  391 N.W.2d 161, 166 (N.D. 1986) (denying Minnesota lawyer compensation for federal 
tax work performed for North Dakota client while lawyer was physically in North Dakota). 
 10.  Birbrower, Montalbano, Condon & Frank v. Superior Court, 949 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1998). 
 11.  Birbrower was eventually limited by rules 9.45-9.49 of the California Supreme Court, 
rules that do not go as far as Rule 5.5 of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct.  But I have kept 
it on the list because it will remain influential, lacks a larger vision, and is from a prominent court.  
 12.  Rancman, 789 N.E.2d at 219. 
 13.  See infra note 54 and accompanying text. 
 14.  See infra notes 92-95 and accompanying text. 
 15.  See infra note 101 and accompanying text.  The court may also see the legislation as an 
intrusion on its inherent power to regulate the bar.  
 16.  OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1349.55 (West 2008) 
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emerged in dramatically different historical circumstances and has been 
rejected outright or much limited by other courts, deserves attention.17
Rancman and Tandon have something in common: the specter of a 
stranger in our midst.
 
18  A non-lawyer has presumed to be part of our 
enterprise even if only at the periphery.  Birbrower is a cousin to this 
alarm: The Court believed lawyers from elsewhere (New York) had 
invaded its turf and must suffer loss of fees for work they did on the 
matter while physically or virtually “in” California (but not for work 
they did when physically in New York, so long as they were not doing 
that work while “virtually” in California, via phone or e-mail, for 
example).19  We saw a similar anxiety over the appearance of the other 
in the debate over multidisciplinary practice (MDP).20  While MDP 
certainly poses legitimate concerns that were thoughtfully raised during 
the American Bar Association (ABA) debate, some comments went over 
the top by projecting the end of the legal profession as we know it.21
Indeed, when we debate new rules, like those in the MDP proposal, 
we have a habit of predicting how they will affect behavior of lawyers 
and clients.  However, we rarely bother with empiricism.  This is not 
limited to threats posed by non-lawyers.  That’s understandable.  
Prediction is easy.  Anyone can do it.  Empiricism is hard.  No matter 
that the predictions may not come true.  We continue to predict with 
only our imagination and ideas about human nature to guide us.  This is 
of course inevitable.  Often, the prediction of untoward consequences is 
intuitively so strong that we ought not chance a proposal.  Sometimes 
empirical testing is not possible, at least not without great expense and 
demands of time.  Sometimes none of this is so, and the prediction is not 
worth much.  
 
 
 17.  See Bluebird Partners, L.P. v. First Fid. Bank, N.A., 731 N.E.2d 581, 585 (N.Y. 2000) 
(tracing the history of the concept to “a type of French feudal tenure in land”).  See also Saladini v. 
Righellis, 687 N.E.2d 1224, 1226 (Mass. 1997), as an example of one state high court that has 
abandoned the concept. 
 18.  See Rancman v. Interim Settlement Funding Corp., 789 N.E.2d 217 (Ohio 2003); 
Professional Adjusters, Inc. v. Tandon, 433 N.E.2d 779, 780 (Ind. 1982).  Tandon gets a worse 
ranking than Rancman.  It barely tries to justify its result beyond telling the legislature to stay off 
the court’s turf.  Id.  
 19.  See generally, Birbrower, Montalbano, Condon & Frank v. Superior Court, 949 P.2d 1 
(Cal. 1998). 
 20.  See American Bar Association’s Center for Professional Responsibility, House of 
Delegates Annual Meeting 7/11/00 Transcript (2000), 
http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mdp/mdp_hod_transc.html.  
 21.  Id.    
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When the ABA debated Rule 5.7, which allows ancillary legal 
services under certain conditions,22 Larry Fox wrote that if lawyers and 
non-lawyers were permitted to co-own businesses that sell ancillary 
legal services, it “could expose the profession to levels of liability that 
have been unheard of until now” and also “undermin[e] our entitlement 
to self-regulation.”23    Didn’t happen.24  When the ABA debated new 
exceptions to Rule 1.6,25 we heard predictions about the end of client 
candor and trust notwithstanding that many jurisdictions had long since 
adopted those very exceptions and a few even made them mandatory, 
seemingly without harm to the client-lawyer relationship.26
Even when we do predict a risk of bad consequences based on our 
understanding of human nature and intuition, often we overlook similar 
situations where we tolerate the same risk without a second thought.  I 
will focus on presumed threats when non-lawyers hover around the work 
of lawyers—the context for Rancman.  We accept the presence of non-
lawyers in so many ways.  We even encourage it.  
 
We permit the non-lawyer agents of organizational clients—
including those who have vital control over the terms and conditions of a 
lawyer’s professional life—to instruct its lawyers on the client’s 
behalf.27  But until the recent amendment to Rule 1.13,28 we have not 
allowed the lawyers to protect the client if those non-lawyers were 
harming it through illegal conduct.29
We allow non-lawyers to pay lawyers to represent clients.
  The unamended rule gave lawyers 
the option of withdrawing and remains the sole option under the 
amended version unless the misconduct is very serious indeed.  
30
 
 22.  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.7 (2007). 
  While 
this may not be much of a problem where a friend or relative is paying 
the client’s bill, the stakes differ when the fees come from insurance 
companies.  A law firm may be highly dependent on the good will of the 
 23.  Lawrence Fox, Restraint is Good in Trade, NAT’L L.J., Apr. 29, 1991, at 17. 
 24.  See id.  Larry Fox might now say that he wrote “could”, not “would”, and surely his 
prediction could have come to pass.  True, but he was adamantly against Rule 5.7.  He was not 
making idle chatter. 
 25.  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6. 
 26.  See STEPHEN GILLERS, ROY D. SIMON, AND ANDREW M. PERLMAN, REGULATION OF 
LAWYERS: STATUTES AND STANDARDS (2010) (providing examples of jurisdictions that mandate 
disclosure of client confidences in some circumstances). 
 27.  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.13(a). 
 28.  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.13(c) (2007). 
 29.  Further, the amendment (or some form of it) has been adopted only in a few states, 
including Arizona, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota and New Jersey.    
 30.  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.8(f). 
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insurer, a frequent source of work.  Meanwhile, the client makes a single 
appearance in the lawyer’s life.  Of course, we tell the lawyer to 
remember who the real client is,31
Malpractice insurance companies can tell law firms what they must 
do to reduce the risk of getting sued and thereby enjoy lower premiums.  
The influence may be entirely salutary; however, that’s not the point.  
We allow it from a lay entity that has monetary leverage.  Banks can 
monitor how law firms are run as businesses.  This encourages banks to 
extend needed lines of credit to law firms.  We let law firms include 
non-legal personnel in a “compensation or retirement plan . . . based in 
whole . . . on a profit-sharing arrangement.”
 but we accept the risk.  To reduce any 
danger of misplaced obedience, we could, but do not, tell law firms that 
they may not let any insurance company account for more than 10 
percent of their income.  We just trust the lawyers. 
32  We choose not to see that 
as fee splitting on the somewhat artificial view that the non-lawyer’s 
participation is in the gross profit, not the recovery in any single case.  In 
Washington, D.C., we let non-lawyers have equity and managerial 
positions in law firms with no untoward consequences so far reported.33
There’s more.  With informed client consent, we let law firms 
accept multiple representations that create concurrent client conflicts.  
However, either client (perhaps the greater source of present and future 
business) may subtly impose on the firm to act for its benefit if interests 
collide or strategies differ.
  
34  The firm may even tilt that way reflexively, 
without a client’s imposition.  Non-lawyers serve on the boards of and 
manage not-for-profit organizations whose legal staffs represent clients 
and where the organization may have a social or political agenda that 
varies from, and is potentially inconsistent with, the best interests of any 
particular client.35  We let law firms share court-awarded legal fees with 
lay-controlled not-for-profit entities that either co-counsel with the firms 
or merely recommend them.36  We let organizations run by lay 
individuals, like union legal service plans, represent their members.37
 
 31. Id. 
 
 32. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.4(a)(3) (2007). 
 33. D.C. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.4 (2008). 
 34. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7(a). 
 35. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.4(d).  A lawyer may not work for an 
organization authorized to practice law if the organization has lay management, but only if the 
organization practices law for a profit. 
 36. MODEL R. 5.4 (a) (4).  
 37. United Transp. Union v. State Bar of Mich., 401 U.S. 576, 584-86 (1971). 
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I do not oppose these arrangements.  Some may be constitutionally 
protected.38
Here, I want to discuss one particular way in which a representation 
may encounter lay influence.  This is through companies offering to buy 
a share in a litigant’s claim.  Let’s look at this economically and use an 
example.  In late 2003, Janie Millicent Deall, a 56-year-old Akron, Ohio 
resident is hurt when a display case at Carl’s Shoe and Sneaker 
Emporium falls on her while she is in the store buying sandals.  She 
loses consciousness.  An ambulance takes her to the hospital.  As it turns 
out, Janie’s injuries are not life threatening, but they are serious.  She 
spends four days in the hospital and will need home health care for 
several months.  Her medical insurance will cover less than half of her 
expenses.  She will be unable to return to her job as an assistant at an 
architectural firm for eight or nine months, perhaps a year.  Her sick 
leave will cover only two weeks’ pay. Her employer’s disability 
insurance provides a pittance.  She has only modest savings.  None of 
her usual expenses are going away and, indeed, her cost of living is 
going up because of medical and other bills related to the accident.  
  Each is beneficial, a symbiosis that works to the advantage 
of all.  Some, as when officers of an organizational client instruct its 
lawyers, are unavoidable because (biological) non-clients must do that.  I 
list various ways in which lay persons may participate along with 
lawyers in the rendition of legal services or may be positioned to exert 
influence on how lawyers render those services only to make the point 
that the risk of improper lay interference is embedded in many client-
lawyer relationships.  Yet we either accept or overlook the risk.  Only 
sometimes do we quiver at the prospect of improper lay influence to 
which lawyers will succumb.  It can be hard to explain the differences in 
our tolerance for risk.  
As it happens, the most valuable asset Janie has to sell at the 
moment is her claim against Carl’s Shoe and Sneaker Emporium, a 
substantial business owned by a company with twelve other shoe and 
sneaker emporiums in the Midwest.  Can Janie sell an interest in this 
asset to keep her afloat while she sues Carl’s?  She has been told it can 
take two or more years before she gets a reasonable settlement offer or a 
trial.  
 
 38.  Id. at 585-86 (holding that union plans are constitutionally protected).  
6
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Yes and no.  She can sell her lawyer an interest in her claim for 
about one-third of her recovery.39  Her lawyer will even pay the 
thousands of dollars needed to prosecute the action and Janie will not 
have to reimburse these unless she prevails.40  In exchange, Janie gets 
excellent legal representation.  But the lawyer cannot help Janie with her 
rent and utility bills, medical costs, or other expenses of daily living.41
Who else will buy her claim?  There is one buyer authorized to pay 
her cash for her claim—cash she can immediately use to pay the rent and 
doctors and buy food until she can start working again.  It is Carl’s Shoe 
and Sneaker Emporium, or more likely its insurance company. Carl’s (or 
its insurer) is in a rather luxurious position.  It is under no time pressure.  
It is, furthermore, the only authorized purchaser of Janie’s claim, the 
only one allowed to bid on it.  Now it requires no MBA to recognize that 
if one person is under duress and needs to sell something and another 
person is the only one legally allowed to buy it, the buyer has an 
enormous advantage.  
  
Janie knows that she will not be able to hold out until she can return to 
work. 
Assume tort lawyers in Akron agree that Janie has a very good 
case.  She has a 90 percent chance of getting $300,000, a conservative 
number, and a 50 percent chance of getting more than $400,000.  
Discounting the risk of loss (10 percent), the value of her claim is at 
least $270,000.  If a third goes to her lawyer, it means the claim is worth 
$180,000 to Janie, ignoring for our purposes the time-value of money.  If 
the cost of litigating the case is $10,000, which Janie must pay from her 
proceeds, she can expect $170,000 in two years or so.  
Carl’s insurer is willing to buy Janie’s claim today for $75,000, 
which will net Janie $50,000 after she pays her lawyer (assuming no 
disbursements).  Janie does not see this as a good deal and neither does 
anyone else, but Janie needs cash and her situation is growing more dire 
monthly.  Is there no one else out there willing to invest in her claim?  
After all, it has a 90 percent chance of success and the $300,000 target is 
conservative.  Surely, she asks her lawyer, someone will partner with her 
even if the lawyer cannot.  Right?  
 
 39.  Rancman v. Interim Settlement Funding Corp., 789 N.E.2d 217, 220 (Ohio, 2003) (court 
assumes a 30 percent contingent fee).  
 40.  OHIO. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.8(e) (1) (2009).  When Rancman entered her 
contract, Ohio had the Code of Professional Responsibility.  Rancman, 789 N.E.2d at 221.  But I 
think it more useful now to use the current professional conduct rules.  Nothing turns on it. 
 41.  OHIO. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.8, cmt. 10. 
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And this is where Janie’s lawyer tells her about Rancman.  Ms. 
Rancman was injured in a one-car collision.42  She sued State Farm for 
uninsured motorist benefits.43  She then contacted a litigation funding 
company.44  Eventually, that company and another company to which it 
referred her, advanced Rancman a total of $7,000.45  In exchange, 
Rancman promised to pay the companies the first $19,600 she recovered 
if the case were resolved within twelve months, the first $25,000 she 
received if resolution took twelve to eighteen months, and the first 
$30,400 she received if the dispute was resolved within twenty-four 
months.46  Rancman would pay nothing if she recovered nothing.47
Rancman settled for $100,000 within twelve months and sued the 
two companies to avoid payment.
 
48  She alleged that the defendants 
were guilty of “unfair, deceptive and unconscionable sales practices. . . 
.”49  The magistrate found in her favor on a different theory.50  The 
magistrate ruled that the money was a loan and the rate usurious.51  On 
appeal, the defendants argued that the money was an investment, not a 
loan, so the usury law did not apply.52  The Supreme Court did not 
address that argument.53  Although neither party raised the issue and 
there was no briefing on it,54 the Supreme Court offered a third reason to 
refuse to enforce the agreement.  It held that the defendants were guilty 
of maintenance and champerty, and the contract therefore void.55
 
  The 
court wrote: 
The advances sub judice constitute champerty because [the 
defendants] sought to profit from Rancman's case.  They also 
constitute maintenance because FSF and Interim each purchased a 
 
 42.  Rancman, 789 N.E.2d at 218. 
 43.  Id.  
 44.  Id.  
 45.  Id. at 218-19. 
 46.  Id. The court does not say what Rancman’s liability would be if the case had been 
resolved after twenty-four months.  Id. 
 47.  Id. 
 48.  Id. at 219. 
 49.  Id.  
 50.  Id. 
 51.  Id. 
 52.  Id.  
 53.  Id 
 54.  Id. at 221 (Christley, J., concurring).  Deciding this important issue without the benefit of 
argument is one reason this case goes on my ten worst list. 
 55.  Id. at 219. 
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share of a suit to which they did not have an independent interest; 
and because the agreements provided Rancman with a disincentive 
to settle her case . . . . 
Equally troubling is a champertor's earning a handsome profit by 
speculating in a lawsuit and by potentially manipulating a party to 
the suit . . . . 
Except as otherwise permitted by legislative enactment or the Code 
of Professional Responsibility, a contract making the repayment of 
funds advanced to a party to a pending case contingent upon the 
outcome of that case is void as champerty and maintenance.  Such 
an advance constitutes champerty and maintenance because it gives 
a nonparty an impermissible interest in a suit, impedes the 
settlement of the underlying case, and promotes speculation in 
lawsuits.  The advances made to Rancman constituted champerty 
and maintenance.  Consequently, the contracts requiring their 
repayment are void and shall not be enforced.56
 
 
The court illustrated the disincentive to settle arithmetically.57  For 
Rancman to recover any additional money, State Farm would have to 
offer more than $28,000, assuming Rancman’s lawyer’s fee was 30 
percent of the recovery and that settlement occurred within twelve 
months.58  In other words, Rancman had no incentive to settle for less 
than $28,000 because she would get nothing from the settlement.59
To further illustrate the effect on incentives, the court went on to 
assume that Rancman wanted to walk away with $80,000 less counsel 
fees ($24,000), or $56,000 net.
  
60  If that were her goal, she would have 
had to hold out for $98,000 in order to recoup the additional $12,600 
(net of counsel fees) she would need to pay the defendants their profit 
(on top of their original payment).61
Now, there are two ways to read the court’s analysis.  They are not 
mutually exclusive.  The simplest reading to which the opinion explicitly 
lends itself is syllogistic.  Major premise: Because maintenance and 
champerty violate public policy, a contract that falls within either 
 
 
 56.  Id. at 220-21. 
 57.  Id. 
 58.  Id. at 220. 
 59.  Id. 
 60.  Id. at 221. 
 61.  Id.  The court’s assumption, in order to prove its point, of a plaintiff whose bottom line 
for settlement is $80,000 is a little too convenient.  See infra note 115. 
9
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category is “void” under Ohio law.62  Minor premise: The defendants 
engaged in maintenance and champerty.63  Conclusion: The contract is 
void.64
Even assuming the accuracy of Rancman’s syllogism,
  End of story. 
65 the fact is 
that the major premise is a product of common law, the court’s own 
law.66  The court could have narrowed the definitions of champerty and 
maintenance.  Elsewhere, courts have declined to follow Rancman 
because the doctrine of champerty in their states is narrower.67  It 
requires that the funding company have instigated the litigation.68  But 
here, Rancman had already sued and she then went to the defendants.69  
They did not inspire her to sue.70
Separately, in defense of its major premise, the court identified 
three harms that the current Ohio law prevented.
 
71  This is the other way 
in which the court justified its holding.  The first harm the court 
identified, as illustrated with its arithmetic models, is that litigation-
funding investments give a party like Rancman “a disincentive to settle 
her case.”72  Second, the defendants would earn “a handsome profit by 
speculating in a lawsuit.”73  Third, the investment created a risk of 
“potentially manipulating a party to the suit.”74  Only the first harm, the 
disincentive to settle, is explained in any depth.75  The other harms are 
just declared.76
Recognition that the investment gave Rancman a “disincentive to 
settle her case” (or to settle for less than a certain sum) is of course 
arithmetically true, as the court nicely illustrated, and I’ll say more about 
that below.
 
77
 
 62.  Rancman, 789 N.E.2d at 221. 
  The court did not spell out what it meant by 
 63.  Id. 
 64.  Id. 
 65.  Id. 
 66.  See Bluebird Partners, L.P. v. First Fid. Bank, N.A., 731 N.E.2d 581, 585 (N.Y. 2000). 
 67.  See, e.g., Odell v. Legal Bucks, Inc., 665 S.E.2d 767, 775 (N.C. App. 2008). 
 68.  Oliver v. Bynum, 592 S.E.2d 707, 711 (N.C. Ct. App. 2004). 
 69.  Rancman, 789 N.E.2d at 218. 
 70.  Id.   
 71.  Id. at 220. 
 72.  Id. 
 73.  Id. at 221. 
 74.  Id.  
 75.  Id. at 220. 
 76.  Id. at 221. 
 77.  Id. at 220-21.  See infra notes 104-16 and accompanying text. 
10
Akron Law Review, Vol. 43 [2010], Iss. 3, Art. 2
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol43/iss3/2
GILLERS 4/12/2010  12:23 PM 
2010] WAITING FOR GOOD DOUGH: 11 
 
manipulation.78  If the fear is that the investors will interfere with 
litigation strategy, the fear is misguided.  The solution is to insure that 
Rancman’s counsel recognizes only her as the client.  We say the same 
when A pays counsel to represent B, including when A is an insurance 
company that is a good source of the lawyer’s business.79
As for the reference to a “handsome profit by speculating in a 
lawsuit,”
  Instead, the 
court could have used its rulemaking power to forbid lawyers to share 
non-public information with investors, like the defendants, or to take 
instructions from them about the matter.  
80 what can the court mean?  The profit was meant to recognize 
the risk of non-recovery.  Rancman’s lawyer took the same risk when he 
“bought” an interest in her claim in exchange for work.81  Contingent 
fees can also be handsome—higher than the market for hourly fees—
precisely because of this risk.82
The word “speculating”
  Why can’t the defendants’ profits also 
be handsome?  It is no answer to say it is because they are not lawyers.  
That simply restates the conclusion.  It is no answer to say that lawyers 
who work on contingency perform a valuable service for the justice 
system.  We must ask whether the defendants here do as well.  
83
Perhaps, what the court means, although it did not say so, was that 
the business of investing in lawsuits was unregulated.  Investors can 
charge whatever they like, not merely handsome but exorbitant profits.  
 is rhetorical and emotive and was 
obviously meant to be.  Were the defendants speculating?  They saw a 
valuable property, a claim, and wished to invest in it, recognizing the 
risks.  We can assume they investigated the merits of Rancman’s claim 
and adjusted their offer accordingly.  “Speculating” is not a word that 
promises to advance serious analysis of the issues before the court.  And 
of course we can use the same word about contingency fee lawyers, but 
we don’t. 
 
 78.  Id. at 221. 
 79.  OHIO RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.8(f) (2009).  Ohio modifies the ABA version of 
this rule by adding a requirement that lawyers who are retained by an insurer to represent an insured 
must give the insured a “Statement of Insured Client’s Rights,” which describes the lawyer’s 
obligations to the client and the insurer.  Id. R. 1.8(f)(4).  See also MODEL RULES OF PROF’L 
CONDUCT R. 1.8(f) (2007).    
 80.  Rancman, 789 N.E.2d at 221. 
 81.  See id. at 220-21.  See also McKenzie Constr. v. Maryland, 823 F.2d 43, 44-45 
(3rd Cir. 1987) (contingent fee that yields $1,430 hourly in 2008 dollars is not unreasonable 
even though it is thirteen times the lawyer’s hourly fee).  
 82.  McKenzie, 823 F.2d at 47-48.  
 83.  Rancman, 789 N.E.2d at 221. 
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Plaintiffs are often desperate.  (Of course that is also true when there is 
only one “buyer,” the defendant in the underlying action, which we 
manage to overlook.) At least, the contingent fee that lawyers may 
charge is (or can be) limited by court rule.84
Perhaps this is why the opinion mentions legislation.
  There is no rule capping the 
profits of a litigation funding companies, and the court was not about to 
write one.  
85  The court 
wrote: “Except as otherwise permitted by legislative enactment or the 
Code of Professional Responsibility, a contract making the repayment of 
funds advanced to a party to a pending case contingent upon the 
outcome of that case is void as champerty and maintenance.”86  It 
appears that the court may have been inviting the legislature to regulate 
the field.87
But if the court meant to extend that invitation, it had an awfully 
strange way of doing so.  Its language is stridently hostile to the whole 
business.
  
88  The court wrote that champerty and maintenance “have been 
vilified in Ohio since the early years of our statehood.”89  It quotes 
precedent for the proposition that maintenance is “an offense against 
public justice [that] . . . perverts the remedial process of the law into an 
engine of oppression.”90  It writes that “[a]n intermeddler is not 
permitted to gorge upon the fruits of litigation.”91
Some lawmakers did, though.  Five years later, Ohio enacted a law 
that permits a “non-recourse civil litigation advance” and purports to 
regulate these.
  What lawmaker will 
read those sentences as encouragement to attempt to legalize such 
harmful practices? 
92  The regulation is light.  Essentially, it requires certain 
notices to the plaintiff (called a “consumer”) in twelve-point type, 
including both the “total dollar amount to be repaid” and the “annual 
percentage rate of return” for varying six-month periods.93
 
 84.  See, e.g, McKenzie, 823 F.2d at 43-48. 
  The law, 
which apparently applies only in contingent fee cases, gives the 
 85.  Rancman, 789 N.E. 2d at 221. 
 86.  Id. 
 87.  See id. 
 88.  See id. at 220. 
 89.  Id. (emphasis added). 
 90.  Id.  (emphasis added) (internal quotes omitted). 
 91.  Id. at 221 (emphasis added). 
 92.  OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1349.55 (West 2008). 
 93.  Id. 
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consumer a five-day cooling off period.94  The consumer must be “a 
person or entity residing or domiciled in Ohio.”95
What the law certainly does not do is prevent “a handsome profit”
  
96 
to the company making the “advance.”97  The profit can be drop-dead 
gorgeous and still legal.  The rate of return is not addressed.  The statute 
also does not reflect Rancman’s alarm over disincentives to settle.98  As 
for the danger of the company “manipulating” the consumer,99 the 
statute says only that the contract must provide (again in twelve-point 
type) that “the company will not make any decisions with regard to the 
underlying civil action or claim or any settlement or resolution thereof 
and that the right to do so remains solely” with the consumer and his or 
her attorney.100
Whether the Ohio Supreme Court will defer to this light regulation 
or see it as an infringement on the court’s inherent power to regulate the 
practice of law, we have yet to learn.
  No language forbids the attorney to share confidential or 
any other information with the company, perhaps because that authority, 
such as it is, is left to the professional conduct rules and substantive law.  
101
 
 94.  Id. 
  For my purpose here, the 
question is whether allowing companies to make non-recourse advances 
is a good thing, and surely it is.  No one has to take an advance.  The 
only question is whether one should be available for those who choose to 
take it.  Let us enumerate their value and some of the contrary 
arguments: 
 95.  Id.  The constitutionality of this last limitation is dubious.  The law would not benefit a 
resident of Indiana harmed by an Ohioan in Ohio, even if Ohio was the sole place of personal 
jurisdiction.  But the Ohioan who sues the Indianan in Ohio could make use of the law.  But that’s a 
debate for another day.  
 96.  Rancman, 789 N.E.2d at 221. 
 97.  OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1349.55. 
 98.  Rancman, 789 N.E.2d at 220. 
 99.  Id. at 221. 
 100.  OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1349.55. 
 101.  Like other state high courts, the Ohio Supreme Court has held that it has inherent power 
over the conduct of lawyers and admission to the bar. 
“[I]t has been methodically and firmly established that the power and responsibility to 
admit and discipline persons admitted to the practice of law, to promulgate and 
enforce professional standards and rules of conduct, and to otherwise broadly 
regulate, control, and define the procedure and practice of law in Ohio rests 
inherently, originally, and exclusively in the Supreme Court of Ohio.”   
Shimko v. Lobe, 813 N.E. 2d 669, 673 (2004).  The extent to which a state high court is willing to 
share this power varies from place to place.  See STEPHEN GILLERS, REGULATION OF LAWYERS: 
PROBLEMS OF LAW AND ETHICS 7-9 (8th ed. 2009).  
13
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a. Litigation funding encourages frivolous litigation.  Highly 
dubious.  These are non-recourse advances in which the company gets 
paid only if the consumer does.  It may get nothing or less than its 
advance.  Companies that pay plaintiffs to bring frivolous cases will 
soon go bankrupt.  The incentive to investigate closely and pick the best 
cases based on historical settlement patterns and verdicts is strong.  
That’s what good contingent fee lawyers do, too. 
b. Litigation funding exploits the vulnerable plaintiff.  The plaintiff 
may be in financial straits or merely wish to spread the risk.  But let us 
assume the former because the latter plaintiff is by definition not 
financially vulnerable.  Without the advance, as illustrated with my 
example of Janie Millicent Deall, the plaintiff can still be exploited, but 
solely by the defendant who can “buy” the entire claim for far less than 
market value.  The advance gives the plaintiff the chance to sell part of 
her claim and retain an interest in part of it.  The plaintiff may be pressed 
by her financial predicament to take the advance, but without it she is 
pressed to sell her entire claim for less than her due, possibly far less.  
Her choice is an economic one, and the cash from the litigation funding 
company may be the more attractive option.  In any event, the 
availability of litigation funding means she will be able to make a 
choice.  She can have multiple buyers. 
c. The consumer lacks information to make an informed choice.  
That need not be.  Despite the Ohio law’s odd provision102
 
 102.  The law says that the contract must say in twelve-point type: “YOU ACKNOWLEDGE 
THAT YOUR ATTORNEY IN THE CIVIL ACTION OR CLAIMS HAS PROVIDED NO . . . 
FINANCIAL ADVICE REGARDING THIS TRANSACTION.”  OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1349.55 
(West 2008).  Whose idea was this?  The plaintiff’s lawyer is best positioned to advise on the 
wisdom of the proposal. Why must this language be in the contract?  Perhaps the trial bar wanted to 
exempt itself from any responsibility for a plaintiff’s decision to accept money from a litigation 
funding company. 
 that purports 
to eliminate the plaintiff’s lawyer as a source of advice on the 
transaction, the lawyer is in a perfect position to give the plaintiff critical 
information.  For starters, an experienced lawyer can help the plaintiff 
shop and compare offers available from other companies.  (Even without 
the lawyer, the client can shop around.)  Beyond that, the lawyer can 
help evaluate the deal by making informed judgments about the several 
variables that should influence the client (as they likely influenced the 
lawyer in taking the matter): What are the chances of success? What is 
the range of the expected recovery? And how long will resolution take?  
The lawyer can offer several “endgame” examples.  “If you recover X 
14
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dollars in Y months, I get so much of it, the company gets so much, and 
you get the rest.”  And so on, with different values for X and Y.  
d. The potential rewards to the company are too “handsome.”103
But even without a limit on the investor’s return, the market can 
impose a limit if several companies compete for the business.  
Furthermore, the presence of funding companies tells the defendant that 
it is not the sole buyer in the market for the plaintiff’s claim.  In other 
words, the mere existence of litigation funding can inspire a defendant to 
increase its settlement offer to enable the plaintiff to avoid having to pay 
the handsome profit.  The defendant can no longer confidently take 
advantage of a plaintiff’s possibly desperate situation.  It has 
competition. 
  
We don’t know what lobbying went into the Ohio bill.  It would be 
interesting to learn but that is beyond the focus of this article.  Perhaps 
the funding companies blocked a cap on their potential recovery.  A law 
could be written limiting recovery just as laws or court rules limit a 
lawyer’s contingent fee in personal injury matters.  On the other hand, 
that may not be feasible because a fair return on an investment will 
depend on variables affecting the risk that cannot easily be captured in a 
legislative formula.  These include the potential scope of recovery, 
likelihood of recovery (how risky is this claim?), and predictions about 
trial calendars.  
e. Lawyers will succumb to the entreaties of the funding companies 
to press their clients to accept offers that may be inadequate.  This is 
what I call the “stop me before I kill again” reason.  Lawyers are weak.  
Funding companies are strong.  Lawyers want them to fund future 
plaintiffs.  Funding companies will not do that if the lawyers fail to 
follow their coded instructions to do what is best for the funding 
companies.  A funding company’s interests conflict with the plaintiff’s 
interest.  The company will be happy with any settlement that yields the 
contract profit regardless of what remains for the plaintiff.  But that may 
not be good for the plaintiff. 
This argument proves too much.  A similar argument can be made 
when a lawyer gets an even modest amount of work from insurance 
companies to represent their insureds.  Anyway, even assuming there is 
any intuitive appeal to the prediction of how lawyers will behave, there 
is something truly perverse in arguing that commercial arrangements 
otherwise good for clients must be forbidden because they may 
 
 103.  Rancman, 789 N.E.2d at 221. 
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sometimes cause lawyers to violate their ethical obligations and 
succumb to the wishes of third parties to the disadvantage of the very 
same clients.  
f. Litigation funding reduces the likelihood of settlement.  This can 
be true for two reasons.  First, settlement may not occur, or occur as 
quickly, because the funds ease the plaintiff’s financial distress and 
enable her to avoid an economically unfair resolution.  That’s a good 
thing.  No legitimate policy can support denial of funding as a way to 
squeeze plaintiffs without financial reserves and thereby force an early 
unjust settlement, especially when defendants can use procedural 
strategies to buy delay.   
The second way in which litigation funding impedes settlement is 
where a borrower who did not need money—or did but because of the 
funding agreement no longer does—rejects reasonable settlement offers 
because they will net him too little or nothing once he pays the funding 
company.  In Rancman’s example, the court wrote that the offer would 
have to be $98,000 if Rancman wished to net $80,000 less counsel 
fees.104  Rancman would want the extra $18,000 to pay the funding 
company after deducting her counsel’s fee on the increment.105  
Otherwise, Rancman would, in this hypothetical, have accepted the 
$80,000.106
We can assume that litigation funding will influence settlement 
positions.  Not only will the funded plaintiff be able to stay in the game 
longer because of the funders’ money, but because she has to share any 
settlement or judgment, she may now hold out for even more money 
than she would otherwise have been prepared to accept, further delaying 
or entirely preventing settlement and forcing a trial.
  
107
 
 104.  Id. 
  Even if the 
plaintiff does appreciate that she can no longer keep as much of the 
money now that she has a partner, she may still want more than she 
would previously have accepted in settlement in order to recoup at least 
part of the difference.  In other words, the plaintiff will wish to shift to 
the defendant at least some responsibility for the cost of her transaction 
with the funders.  So while the cash from the litigation funding company 
may save a plaintiff from having to succumb to an improvident 
 105.  Id.  She would also have to repay the $7,000 she received, but that repayment does not 
affect her net recovery.  
 106.  Id. 
 107.  See id.  
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settlement, the flip side is that the obligation to the company may now 
cause her to hold out for unrealistic offers or go to trial.  
This is a legitimate concern, but there are several reasons to dismiss 
it.  First, even if the prediction that the plaintiff’s changed circumstances 
will increase the likelihood of trial is true, we must ask whether that 
prospect as a matter of public policy justifies denying the needy plaintiff 
the financial means that will enable her to reject a settlement offer that is 
too low.  Which harm is worse?  
Let’s consider the various harms.  The harm to the plaintiff is that 
she may do no better or worse at trial than the last settlement offer 
before trial, perhaps much worse.  We can dismiss that concern because 
it is a product of her strategic (presumably counseled) choice.  The 
litigation funders will have to wait longer for their money and may not 
get paid at all or as much, depending on the verdict.  But this is a danger 
of which they will have been aware when they set their “price” and 
against which they can partly protect themselves, as discussed below.  
The defendant will have the added expense of trying the case and 
the plaintiff’s lawyer will have to spend the extra time required to try the 
case and perhaps extra disbursements.  The defendant of course can 
avoid a trial with a more generous settlement offer and the plaintiff’s 
lawyer will be aware of any increased likelihood of trial when he accepts 
a client who may turn to a litigation funding company.  In fact, the 
plaintiff’s lawyer may see the existence of these companies as a good 
thing on the whole, because even though funding may make trial more 
likely or make cases take longer to settle, absence of funding can avoid 
early, low settlements.  
Last is the harm to the court system, which may now be forced to 
try a case that would otherwise have settled.  Let’s accept that this is 
something we should try to avoid.  I first question whether we can even 
say that the prospect of trial is appreciably more likely.  There are ways 
to hedge that risk. The funding company can dim the plaintiff’s 
enthusiasm to press for trial (“what do I have to lose?”) by, as in 
Rancman and as recognized in the ensuing legislation, calibrating the 
return on its investment to the length of time before the matter is 
resolved.108  The longer it takes to resolve, the greater the company’s 
return.109
 
 108.  Id. at 218-19. 
  In Rancman itself, the funding companies would have been 
entitled to $19,600 if the case ended within twelve months, but their 
 109.  Id.  
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entitlement would increase by $5,400 in each ensuing six-month 
period.110  To net each increment, the borrower would have had to 
recover as much as $8,000 in order first to pay her lawyer’s contingent 
fee.111  That reality should encourage a plaintiff in Rancman’s position 
to treat settlement offers seriously.  In other words, Rancman did have 
something to lose by delay, namely keeping more of the eventual 
payment.112  And of course Rancman herself did settle within twelve 
months, before she could know whether the court would uphold her 
agreement with the funding companies, which raises the possibility that 
the agreement actually encouraged settlement.113
Furthermore, if the defendant is entitled to learn of the litigation 
funding agreement or does learn of it informally, as is likely, it will 
understand that the chances to settle are greatest before any current six-
month period ends.  The plaintiff will keep more of the money. Indeed, 
the plaintiff may choose to present this fact in negotiations.  “I’ll take so 
much now but I’ll want more next month.”  And as stated above, the 
very fact that a plaintiff in need can get litigation funding at all—the fact 
that there are other buyers for at least part of her claim—should alert the 
defendant that it cannot count on plaintiff’s financial exigency to get a 
lower price.  It is no longer a monopolistic buyer.  It may even make an 
attractive settlement offer before the plaintiff enters the market for, or 
commits to, litigation funding.  The plaintiff may use that prospect in 
early negotiation.  Indeed, for all we know, State Farm made the 
$100,000 offer it did when it did
  
114
Nor should we assume that the funded plaintiff will act irrationally.  
While the fact that the funding company has become her partner may 
cause her to desire a greater settlement, that fact does not change the 
value of her claim.  If she had a 90 percent chance of recovering 
$300,000 before she accepted the funding, that remains her chance.  She 
must still weigh any offer against the time it will otherwise take to get to 
judgment (and the increment in the funding company’s profit if it does 
 because Rancman had secured 
litigation funding. 
 
 110.  Id. 
 111.  See id.  
 112.  See id.  
 113.  Id. at 219. 
 114.  Id. 
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take longer) and the risk of loss or of recovering less than what the 
lawyer has said the case is worth.115
For these reasons, we should not assume that litigation funding will 
increase the number of trials.  We certainly should not make policy 
based on such a possibility without proof when the consequence is to 
force financially pressed plaintiffs to lose the reasonable value of their 
claim.  Besides, even if there are more trials, so what?  That puts a 
burden on the court system, but it’s a burden to try cases, which is why 
the court system exists in the first place.  It’s what judges get paid to do.  
Are we really prepared to say that a state’s justice system will not allow 
a plaintiff to get the funds she needs to persist in an effort to secure just 
compensation because then judges will have to try some number of cases 
that would otherwise have settled, a number we can’t even quantify?  I 
hope not.  
 
Maybe, given Ohio’s corrective legislation,116
 
 I’ll remove Rancman 
from my list of ten worst cases, or will once the Ohio courts uphold the 
statute.  I won’t have any trouble finding a new case to take its spot.  The 
pool of really bad decisions, while thankfully shallow, never seems to 
run dry.  
 
 115.  This is why Rancman’s hypothetical of a plaintiff who wants to settle for $80,000 is not 
useful.  Id. at 221.  It allows the court to posit an intransigent plaintiff (“$80,000 and not a penny 
less!”), and therefore an inevitable set of consequences that must follow, while ignoring other 
factors, including counsel’s advice and predictions, which may influence any plaintiff’s initial 
settlement position.  
 116.  OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1349.55 (West 2008). 
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